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Elliott: Tensions Between Redevelopment and Equity

DO PLANNERS ALWAYS HAVE TO MAKE THE NEIGHBORHOOD
“BETTER”? RETHINKING THE DISTURBING TENSIONS BETWEEN
REDEVELOPMENT AND EQUITY
Don Elliott*
ABSTRACT
America’s public sector planners are constantly trying to “make things
better.” That has been true ever since planning became a profession. Planners are
paid to think broadly about how emerging demographic, economic, environmental,
and mobility trends will impact life in our communities, and then make
recommendations and write regulations to respond to those trends in ways that
make the city a better place. In fact, if planners were not doing that, it is not clear
why cities should pay them. For the most part, the predominant focus by planners
is making communities physically better through comprehensive, neighborhood,
sector, and corridor plans. Unanswered in most plans and planning processes is the
question “make it better for whom?” While there is often an implicit assumption
that the neighborhood should be made better for those who live there, the problem
is that if the plan succeeds in improving the physical environment, the current
residents may not be the ones who benefit from the change. In this article, I address
the disturbing tensions between redevelopment planning and social equity.
INTRODUCTION
For most of the profession’s young life (only about 100 years in its current
form), “making things better” has focused on improving the physical environment.
If housing is deteriorating, make plans to spur renovation and construction of new
housing. If streets are congested with cars, make plans for better streets, or parking
lots to get some of those cars out of the streets. Or better yet, put more development
density near transit so fewer people need to drive as often. If the children do not
have safe places to play, plan for more parks. If residents do not have access to
fresh food, plan to improve local food systems and allow and encourage more
grocery stores. If local history and character are being destroyed, plan to preserve
more buildings.
It is not really that simple, of course. Some planners have always focused
on encouraging local job creation, or increasing educational opportunities, or on
community engagement and empowerment. They reflect a different view of what
makes things better. But the predominant focus on planning for a better physical
*
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environment permeates most comprehensive, neighborhood, sector, and corridor
plans.
Left unanswered in most plans and planning processes, however, is the
question “make it better for whom?” Community engagement during most
neighborhood planning processes often focuses on the current residents, businesses,
and property owners in the neighborhood. And since there is never enough money
to make plans for every neighborhood, the planning often focuses on those
neighborhoods most in need of “making better,” which tend to be
disproportionately occupied by lower income households and communities of
color.1 While there is often an implicit assumption—by both neighborhood
residents and planners -- that the neighborhood should be made better for those who
live there, there are serious problems with that assumption. The most serious
problem is that if the plan succeeds in improving the physical environment, the
current residents may not be the ones who benefit from the change.
THE JUSTFINE PARADIGM
The tension between “making things better” and benefitting current
neighborhood residents is extraordinarily complex, and there is no right answer. At
the risk of oversimplifying (again), imagine a planning process for the Justfine
neighborhood, which has aging and deteriorating housing. Some would call it
Naturally Occurring Affordable Housing—it is not subsidized or income-restricted,
but due to the age and quality of the housing it is pretty affordable. Justfine also has
an incomplete sidewalk system, few parks, a struggling public school, and a
smattering of smaller independent businesses occupying older buildings without
much parking.
The neighborhood is clearly deserving of city attention to make it better,
and the city announces a neighborhood planning process. Justfine residents and
businesses are pleased. Those who own their homes and buildings think perhaps
better conditions will lead their lives to improve and their property value to
increase. Some tenants hope neighborhood conditions will improve, while others
just hope their rents do not increase to reflect those improved conditions. The real
estate market does what it does best, it smells opportunity, begins to pay more
attention, raises its purchase offers by 10 percent, and begins buying property from
those willing to sell.
Let’s assume the planners do a great job engaging the community. Instead of
notifying only property owners and publicizing the planning effort in public places
and websites, they also notify all Justfine residential and business tenants. This is
1

The structural biases in zoning towards privileged sections of U.S. society is well documented in
Rothstein, Richard, The Color of Law, Liveright, 2017.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/jculp/vol5/iss1/15

126

Elliott: Tensions Between Redevelopment and Equity

optimistic, since in most cities notification of existing tenants does not happen.
Let’s further assume that things go well and that the true desires of each participant
are accurately recorded and allowed to influence the planning process. But the
result will be a mix of desires from:


Long-time residents who own their property and want to continue to occupy
it;



Long-time residents who own their property and would be happy to sell and
move at the right price;



Recent property buyers who want to improve and occupy their properties;



Recent property buyers who do not occupy their properties and are primarily
interested in rental revenue and property appreciation;



Renters who want to stay and can afford higher rent;



Renters who want to stay but cannot afford higher rent; and



Renters who would be happy to move.

Regardless of the mix of participants in each of these categories, their combined
desires will reflect not only those of existing residents who want to stay, but also
those of long-term residents and recent property buyers who do not plan to live in
Justfine in the future. This is important: With the best of intentions, this well-run
planning process will result in a plan that reflects the desires of some people who
do not live and have no intention of living in the neighborhood.
To continue with our example, we’ll assume that the Justfine neighborhood plan
recommends a blend of public investments and private actions to “make it better.”
Recommended public investments include new sidewalks, a new pocket park (or
two), and a small, centrally located parking lot to make it easier for pass-by traffic
to patronize local businesses. Maybe it also makes it easier for area property owners
to get renovation loans under the city’s revolving loan program. To spur private
investment in housing, the plan recommends zoning changes to allow individual
homes to occupy more of their lots, as well as increases in permitted multifamily
densities along major streets. Maybe it also allows the construction of accessory
dwelling units. The real estate industry responds as predicted; purchase offers rise
another 10 percent and some more existing property owners decide to sell.
As properties begin to change hands and the new owners want to recoup their
20 percent higher purchase prices, rents begin to rise, and those residential and
business tenants that cannot afford the new rents may well be displaced. Involuntary
displacement is not a foregone conclusion, of course. Perhaps a compassionate
property owner will not raise the rent, or maybe the business owner was ready to
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retire anyway and decided this was a good time to do so, but these may be the
exceptions. In general, those involuntarily displaced will tend to be those with the
lowest household incomes or the weakest business revenue streams. In most cities
those residents and businesses owners may well include a disproportionate number
of persons of color and/or women and/or the disabled. This is important as well.
The predictable outcome of a neighborhood planning process with a mix of
recommendations for public and private actions to “make it better” through physical
improvements is likely to lead to some level of involuntary displacement that has
disproportionate impacts on women, persons of color, and lower income
households.
Let’s take the scenario one step further. Assume that the city is worried about
involuntary displacement of existing Justfine residents, so it requires that all new
construction of projects with more than 20 dwelling units set aside at least 20
percent of those units for households at the current Justfine average household
income, and that existing residents be given first priority to occupy those units.
Some cities do not have the legal authority to do this, but sometimes it happens, so
let’s assume that it works perfectly (in spite of strong evidence that it seldom does).
As new projects are built, 20 percent are actually occupied by some of the very
same people that participated in the Justfine planning process.
Even under these perfect assumptions, however, there may be significant
impacts on the existing Justfine residents—the ones for whom the planners
assumed they were making the place better. The 20 percent of new units that are
“affordable” may not be enough to house all those involuntarily displaced. Some
of those displaced will have resettled in other neighborhoods, enrolled their
children in other schools, and may not want to move back to Justfine. Those
households that earn less than the average Justfine income will not be able to afford
the new income-restricted units. To offset the lost revenue from the 20 percent
income-restricted units, the developers will need to rent or sell the remaining 80
percent of new housing units at higher prices than they otherwise could.
WHY IT HAPPENS
The Justfine example is just a hypothetical, of course. Real neighborhoods are
much more complicated, real planning processes vary a lot, and cities have many
more tools available to mitigate the unintended impacts of “making it better.”
However, the basic dynamics of the Justfine examples tend to be true and are
grounded in four key facts.
1. Money flows toward new investment opportunities. When a new
neighborhood plan allows more development, or new kinds of development
supported by the market, new money will flow towards Justfine.
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2. People are free to sell their properties if and when they want. While it is
tempting to think of Justfine’s property sellers as landlord just interested in
“cashing out,” they are just as likely to be longtime residents who will
pocket the sale price to fund their retirement. The law treats them the same.
It also good to remember that those property owners who may want to sell
their property for a profit and relocate or retire could well be women,
persons of color, and persons with disabilities whose lives are improved
when they receive a higher sales price.
3. Households with more money can outbid those with less money. When
neighborhoods are made “nicer,” and there is increased competition to live
in the area, that competition will generally be won by those with more
money—regardless of whether they want to live in the housing or rent it
out.
4. Rents for new residential construction are almost always higher than for
existing housing. Naturally Occurring Affordable Housing is affordable in
part because it was built decades ago when costs for materials, labor, and
the energy to construct housing were significantly lower, and those initial
costs have been repaid long ago. While the current owners will probably
charge whatever rent the market will bear, in marginal neighborhood like
Justfine that price is likely to be lower than the lowest rent a new developer
can charge for a new unit.
This last point is key. Before the Justfine planning process began, property
values did not reflect the better quality of life that would result from new sidewalks,
parks, and more intense development. That was Naturally Occurring Affordable
Housing un-influenced by city intervention (or conversely, kept low in part due to
lack of city attention). Once the planning process was announced, and after the plan
was published, property values, sales prices, and rental rates rose by 20 percent.
Ten years from now, Justfine’s housing stock will include a mix of existing
housing that has not been improved (the owner is not yet interested in investing or
selling), older housing that has received upgrades and can charge higher rents than
un-improved housing, and new housing built after the zoning changes. In a perfect
market (which never exists) rents for these units should stabilize around values that
differ only based on the quality of the housing unit (the newer one can charge higher
rent because it is nicer, not because it is newer). In practice, however, the price of
housing that has been built or renovated recently will almost always be higher than
“standard” units that have received less investment—i.e., higher than that of
Naturally Occurring Affordable Housing that existed before the planning effort. In
short, without very deep public subsidies, it is very unlikely that the 80 percent of
housing built in Justfine will be affordable to many of the current residents.
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As the dynamics of the Justfine example have played out in cities throughout
the U.S., these trends have become more apparent—not only to planners, but to
neighborhood residents and business owners. Not surprisingly, then, planners have
started hearing neighborhood residents ask that planners “not make it better.”
Because of worries about rising rents and displacement, some residents have been
asking planners to “leave it alone”—i.e., to discourage public investments and
avoid creating new incentives for private investment.
IS IT TIME FOR A “DON’T INVEST HERE” OVERLAY ZONE?
This poses a fundamental question for the planning profession. If a city
wants to reduce the displacement of its most vulnerable renters, should planners be
actively trying to “not make it better.” Are there times where “making it better” for
households with lower incomes (which are disproportionately headed by persons
of color, women, and the disabled) means actively discouraging investment in the
neighborhood—even if the physical condition of the housing and businesses in the
area is likely to continue to deteriorate? Or, to put it another way, are there times
when planners should actively ignore the physical deterioration of a neighborhood
in order to “make it better” for those who fear that any change for the better will
lead to displacement?
One way to do that would be to create a “Don’t Invest Here” overlay zoning
district—or more realistically a “Limited Investment” overlay zone. The overlay
might include, for example, a provision limiting the physical expansion of an
existing structure to no more than 10 or 20 percent of the gross floor area during
each five-year period. Or it could include a limit on the dollar value of building
permits issued for a structure to 10 or 20 percent of the assessed fair market value
of the property during each five-year period. Or it might prohibit the expansion of
any one-story structure into a two-story structure (a “pop-top”), even though the
underlying zoning district would permit that expansion.
There could be exceptions granted for accidental damage or destruction, or
to bring the building into compliance with building, fire, safety, or accessibility
codes. Perhaps there could be an exception if any investments above the 10 or 20
percent limits was required to create a dwelling unit that is affordable at very low
levels of Area Median Income, which would allow investments by community land
trusts or affordable housing non-profits. Any combination of these tools would
allow a property owner to make periodic investments while discouraging the real
estate market from targeting the area in ways that would lead to the destruction of
Naturally Occurring Affordable Housing.
More dramatically, the city could adopt a policy of limited public
investment in the area in order to avoid expectations of rising property values.
Instead of prioritizing neighborhood park construction and upgrading, it could de-
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prioritize those actions. Instead of granting permits for sidewalk cafes on private
property, it could refuse to issue those permits on the basis that some view outdoor
dining spaces as symbols of impending gentrification.2 Again, this reflects a
dramatic reversal of the traditional planner’s role—a decision not to “make it
better” for the sake of the vulnerable population. It could also mean that some
federal and state funds required to be spent in low-income areas could not be spent
in this particular low-income area. Policies like these would reflect a city decision
that “making it better” for low-income residents to stay in place means not “making
it better” in terms of the physical characteristics of the area.
While a Limited Investment overlay district may seem strange, there are
already analogies in the zoning world. Many historic preservation overlay districts
are already limited investment districts. In order to achieve a city priority (heritage
preservation) they affirmatively limit the types of investment that can be made in
the districts. Those that reinforce the intended character are allowed; those that
would weaken that character are not.3 It does not matter that the new building would
be “better” in terms of aesthetics, economics, and maybe even safety—the city as a
whole says it is “better” for the old building to stay. The landmark case of Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City4 involved a decision by New York
City to “make it better” by not allowing the real estate market to make investments
that would compromise Grand Central Station.
A second example comes from Youngstown, Ohio, which in 2013 adopted
a Limited Services Overlay district for a large and mostly undeveloped area in the
northeast corner of the city.5 The goal of the overlay was to prevent significant new
property investments that would expand the demand for police protection, fire
protection, and water system improvements in an area of the city where the city
could not afford to extend those systems and protections. Existing uses of the
property and minor changes were allowed; conditional use approvals and variances
were prohibited, and significant private investments were discouraged. The overlay
said, in effect, “we don’t intend to make this area “better”; we cannot afford the
consequences of doing so.”

2

See, for example, How to Track a Neighborhood’s Gentrification Through Restaurant Openings
(eater.com),Vince Dixon, September 30, 2020.
3

See, for example, Duluth, Minnesota, Unified Development Chapter Section 50-18.3 Historic
Preservation Overlay or Albany, New York, Unified Sustainable Development Ordinance Section
375-2(F)(1) Historic Resources Overlay.
4
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BUILDING ON ZONING’S STRENGTH
Many of the current challenges facing zoning arise from its DNA—the fact
that zoning powers were designed to exclude rather than include. When the market
wants to prevent a particular type of investment, zoning can—and with enough
political backbone behind it will—prevent the investment from being made. An
investor who can make a good return building a 10-story building on land zoned
for three story buildings can and often will be prevented from making that
investment. From the beginning, the very purpose of zoning was to thwart market
investment pressures that would damage the intended character of different
neighborhoods.6
But zoning is much less effective at including desired uses. It has a hard
time making desired land uses happen if they are not supported by the market.
Zoning cannot force an investor to build a 10-story building just because it changes
the zoning to allow 10-story buildings. If market demand will only support and
lenders will only finance a three-story building, then the 10-story building will not
get built. On a more human level, zoning can be amended to allow grocery stores
in areas that need them, but zoning alone cannot make them happen if there is not
enough market demand to support a grocery store. Zoning also has a hard time
forcing affordable housing to be built in expensive neighborhoods with high land
prices.
While zoning can in some cases be drafted to induce development that
would not otherwise occur (for example, by allowing an extra five stories of
apartments in return for a ground floor grocery store), that only works when there
is almost enough market demand to support the desired use and allowing extra
density can make up that difference. Of course, money can often solve this—zoning
for density plus a public subsidy can induce the market to build things the market
does not want to build. But money is always in short supply and imagining that
subsidies will be available is often a poor bet. At its heart, zoning was designed to
exclude, and the fact that zoning gymnastics are needed to change that just proves
the point.
A limited investment overlay zone plays to zoning’s strength; it builds on
zoning’s DNA of exclusion. It simply prohibits investment where the market would
otherwise like to invest, which zoning has been doing for 100 years. The difference
is that we have seldom seen the power to exclude used to prohibit investments that
most observers would agree would “make things better.” Instead, zoning has
generally been used to prevent investments that are out of character with the desired
6
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height, scale, and purpose of a neighborhood. There is no question that the market
driven investment would have been “better” than what is currently on the property
but zoning politely says “this is not the right place,” or “that’s too much of a good
thing for this area.” A limited investment overlay zone simply extends that logic to
say, “this is not the right place to make any significant investment.” This is not a
new idea; it is an extension of an old idea that just shifts the public purpose from
protection of the physical character of the area to preservation of its economic
character.
In light of the serious and growing housing affordability crisis that plagues
most cities, the protection of Naturally Occurring Affordable Housing ought to
become a priority because the rents and sales prices of those older (and generally
smaller) homes and apartments are substantially lower than those for new
construction. That is particularly true if the sales prices for existing housing do not
reflect the potential demolition and replacement of the house with a much bigger
house. Without the speculative value of the land for redevelopment, sales prices
(and the resulting rents if they are rented out) are likely to remain substantially
lower than if the size of the house could be doubled or tripled. Limited investment
overlay zones could do exactly that. They could remind the market—just like
property in a historic district—that these houses and shops are to be priced for reuse
without substantial expansion or redevelopment.
ON THE OTHER HAND
Limited investment overlay zones are one potential tool that could help
resolve the tension between our desires for redevelopment and our desire for equity
and affordability. They could limit and pace reinvestment to make it less likely that
gentrification and involuntary displacement take place. They put the government’s
thumb on the equity side of the scale by limiting the scale and pace of development
in ways that will discourage speculation based on the anticipation of a “better”
neighborhood. But they do have three negative impacts.
First, long-time property owners who want to sell their properties will find
that offering prices are lower than they would be without the overlay. The windfall
that comes through speculation and gentrification, and that might have funded their
retirement or relocation, will be smaller. If the neighborhood really does have a
disproportionate population of households or businesses headed by women, persons
of color, or the disabled, those smaller payouts will have a disproportionate effect
on them.
Second, the housing stock will continue to age, may become more
functionally obsolete, and may deteriorate in spite of the ability to make small
investments for renovations and repairs. Some of our Naturally Occurring
Affordable Housing was built cheaply (that’s one reason why current rents are low)
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and cannot be made to last forever. The market-driven replacement of older
buildings by new ones is one of the ways cities renew themselves, and it is generally
a healthy outcome of market driven investment. A limited investment overlay zone
puts its foot on the brake in some of the poorer neighborhoods that would otherwise
be most ripe for renewal and redevelopment. It creates an economic distortion that
may drive speculation into other almost-as-affordable-but-unprotected
neighborhoods, and it may mean that housing conditions in the overlay zone get
worse over time.
This is a serious and likely consequence of a limited investment overlay
zone. If “better” places tend to be occupied by more affluent households, and we
try to discourage that by not making the place “better,” its physical quality may
well decline, and the consequences of this not-as-nice-as-it-could-be status (broken
sidewalks, few parks, marginal businesses) may well impact persons of color, and
low-income families, and women-headed households most. Those consequences
are themselves inequitable and might only be justified if the city concludes that they
are the lesser of two evils—that the inequities that result from involuntary
displacement of those current residents is worse than allowing the physical quality
of the neighborhood to continue to erode. But that is a decision that local elected
officials—acting rationally and in what they believe to be the best interests of the
residents and the city—could make. It may violate our expectations as to how
elected officials should balance the tensions between redevelopment and
displacement, but it would easily pass the “rational relationship” test needed to
uphold most local government actions.
Third, and most fundamentally, the use of a limited investment overlay zone
violates the fundamental assumption that planning and zoning are there to preserve
or improve the physical quality of our neighborhoods. It requires a different
understanding of zoning as a power that can sometimes be used to “make it better”
economically by not making it better physically. But that may be exactly what is
needed to resolve the uneasy tension between redevelopment and equity over the
next 30 years. That is particularly true as the planning profession begins to take the
impacts of zoning on equity and displacement more seriously than we have in the
past. Getting different outcomes requires thinking differently—including thinking
harder about what “better” means.
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